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 AN INSTITUTIONAL ALCHEMY: 
INDIA’S TWO PARLIAMENTS IN 
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
Shubhankar Dam* 
INTRODUCTION: THE PRESIDENT AS THE SOLE LEGISLATOR 
yoti Singh Pandey, a twenty-three-year-old physiotherapy 
intern, was gang raped in New Delhi on December 16, 
2012.1 Six men were involved, one of them a teenager. Their 
assault left Jyoti with grave injuries to her abdomen, intes-
tines, and genitals.2 The teenager was the most ferocious of the 
six men. He raped his victim twice and “ripped out her intes-
tines with his bare hands.”3 This display of hypersexualized 
                                                                                                                                     
* Shubhankar Dam, Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management 
University School of Law; LL.M. (Harvard); B.C.L. (Oxon). Former law clerk 
to Hon. Mr. V. N. Khare, Chief Justice of India, Indian Supreme Court. SMU 
Office of Research provided funding for this paper. Versions of this Article 
were presented at the Boston Law and Society Annual Meeting 2013 and the 
Inaugural Young Scholars Workshop on Socio-legal Studies, National Uni-
versity Singapore Law Faculty, 2013. Gary Bell, Malcolm Feeley, Andrew 
Harding, Tom Ginsburg, Swagata Raha, and the conference participants pro-
vided valuable feedback. Katelyn Ciolino, Thomas Slattery, and their team of 
editors provided excellent editorial assistance. I am grateful to them. The 
usual rejoinder applies. 
 1.  Raj Shekhar & Dwaipayan Ghosh, Girl Gang-Raped in Moving Bus in 
Delhi, TIMES INDIA (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-17/delhi/35868316_1_bus-
mahipalpur-new-delhi; Wieland Wagner, ‘The Fearless One’: Rape Trial Gal-
vanizes India, DER SPIEGEL (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/jyoti-singh-pandey-nirbhaya-rape-
trial-brings-india-together-a-917401.html. The four adult defendants were 
sentenced to death by hanging in September 2013. Ellen Barry, Many Doubt 
Death Sentences Will Stem India Sexual Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/world/asia/4-sentenced-to-death-in-rape-
case-that-riveted-india.html. 
 2. Savagery Shames City, MAIL TODAY (Dec. 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SAVAGERY+SHAMES+CITY.-a0312332626. 
 3. Jatin Anand, Dehli Rape: Juvenile Raped Woman Twice and Ripped off 
Her Intestine, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/chunk-ht-ui-indiasectionpage-
delhigangrape/delhi-rape-juvenile-raped-woman-twice-and-ripped-off-her-
intestine/article1-984188.aspx. He was found guilty in August 2013. Delhi 
J
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brutality enraged parts of India. Protests erupted.4 Thousands 
descended onto the streets of New Delhi demanding a prompt 
trial of the accused persons and better protection for women in 
the capital city.5 Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh ap-
pealed for calm.6 He tasked a committee to recommend legisla-
tive changes to sternly deal with incidents of sexual assault.7 
With the former Chief Justice of India, J. S. Verma, at its helm, 
the committee promptly produced a report that counseled sev-
eral changes to criminal law in India.8 Partly based on these 
recommendations, President Pranab Mukherjee promulgated a 
piece of legislation amending the law against sexual assaults 
and instituted the death penalty for rape.9 How could the pres-
ident amend the criminal code and introduce new punishments 
all by himself? This Article is about India’s “Alternative Par-
liament”—an arrangement under which the president may in-
dependently enact legislation.10 
                                                                                                                                     
Gang Rape: Teenager Found Guilty, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-23908176. 
 4. Dean Nelson, Gang Rape of Indian Woman Sparks Mass Protests, 
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9755913/Gang-rape-
of-Indian-woman-sparks-mass-protests.html. 
 5. Jason Burke, Delhi Bus Gang Rape: ‘What Is Going Wrong with Our 
Society?,’ GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/19/delhi-bus-gang-rape. 
 6. Jason Burke, India Gang Rape Protests: Manmohan Singh Appeals for 
Calm, GUARDIAN (Dec. 24. 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/24/inadian-gang-rape-protests-
manmohan-singh. 
 7. Justice Verma Committee Gets to Work; Seeks Public Comments, DNA 
INDIA (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-delhi-gang-rape-
justice-verma-committee-gets-to-work-seeks-public-comments-1781257. 
 8. Verma Panel for Stiffer Punishment to Rapists but No Death, NEW 
INDIAN EXPRESS (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://newindianexpress.com/nation/article1432575.ece. 
 9. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013 (3 of 2013), available 
at http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/criminalLawAmndmt-040213.pdf; B. Muralidhar 
Reddy, Despite Protest, Ordinance on Sexual Offences Promulgated, HINDU 
(Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/despite-protest-
ordinance-on-sexual-offences-promulgated/article4375214.ece. The Verma 
Committee, it should be mentioned, did not recommend the death penalty. In 
fact, the suggestion was categorically rejected. 
 10. Formally speaking, India’s Parliament is made up of three organs: the 
president, the Council of States (Upper House), and the House of the People 
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India has a parliamentary system, but articled in India’s 
Constitution is a provision that authorizes the president to en-
act legislation without involving Parliament. Such presidential 
legislation is called an “ordinance” not an act, and rather than 
enact, the president “promulgates” it. At the federal level, the 
mechanism is provided for in Article 123:11 
(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are 
in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist 
which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, 
he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances 
appear to him to require. 
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have 
the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every 
such Ordinance - 
(a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and 
shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks 
from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the 
expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it 
are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the 
second of those resolutions; and 
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President. 
Explanation: Where the Houses of Parliament are summoned 
to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall 
be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of 
this clause. 
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any 
provision which Parliament would not under this Constitu-
tion be competent to enact, it shall be void. 
Five features are worth highlighting. First, ordinances may 
be promulgated only if at least one House of Parliament is not 
in session. Second, though nominally granted to the president, 
the power to promulgate ordinances, in practice, is exercised by 
the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers decides if an 
ordinance is necessary. It also drafts the ordinance, but the 
president formally promulgates it into effect. While the presi-
dent has some discretion in this regard, the scope of that dis-
cretion still remains unclear. Third, ordinances are temporary 
                                                                                                                                     
(Lower House). See INDIA CONST. art. 79. In this Article, Parliament is re-
ferred to in its nontechnical sense; that is, to the two Houses of Parliament. 
 11. At the state level, governors too enjoy similar powers. See INDIA CONST. 
art. 213. 
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measures and remain in force until the expiry of six weeks 
from the commencement of the next legislative session.12 
Fourth, ordinances are like parliamentary legislation: they 
have the “same force and effect.”13 They are not rules, orders, 
bylaws, or delegated legislation of some other kind. Rather, 
they are legislation proper. Fifth, and perhaps most important-
ly, ordinances and acts have similar substantive width.14 The 
president may use an ordinance to do all the things Parliament 
may do through an act. 
Ordinances have a large presence in India. Originally a Brit-
ish innovation, they matured into India’s legislative design 
over time15 and their prominence has only grown post-
independence. Between 1952 and 2009, presidents promulgated 
615 ordinances at an average of 10.5 every year.16 During the 
same period, Parliament enacted 3467 acts.17 In other words, 
approximately 17.7% of all acts originated as ordinances. But 
their importance goes beyond numbers: some of India’s most 
controversial policies were initially legislated through ordi-
nances. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, per-
fected this practice—he nationalized industries and enacted 
anti-terror legislation using ordinances.18 His successors zeal-
ously followed him in this respect. The mechanism has since 
been used to introduce legislation in many fields including 
crime,19 human rights,20 finance,21 national security,22 proper-
ty,23 religion,24 and taxation.25 
                                                                                                                                     
 12. INDIA CONST. art. 123(2). 
 13. Id. art. 123(2). 
 14. Id. art. 123(3). 
 15. For a description of this evolution, see SHUBHANKAR DAM, 
PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATION IN INDIA: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ORDINANCES 
27–65 (2014).  
 16. See PRESIDENTIAL ORDINANCES, 1950–2009 (2011). 
 17. STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 52 
(2012), http://mpa.nic.in/Statbook12.pdf (India) [hereinafter STATISTICAL 
HANDBOOK]. 
 18. See, e.g., Life Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1956, No. 
1 of 1956, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (Jan. 19, 1956); 
Armed Forces (Assam & Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance, 1958, No. 1 of 
1958, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (May 22, 1958). 
 19. See, e.g., Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Ordinance, 1966, No. 6 of 
1966, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (June 17, 1966). 
 20. See, e.g., Protection of Human Rights Act, No. 30 of 1993, INDIA CODE. 
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Ordinances are bounded by several “controls.” First, proce-
durally, they are limited to circumstances when at least one 
House of Parliament is not in session. Substantively, the presi-
dent—technically with the approval of the Council of Minis-
ters—must be satisfied that circumstances necessitate imme-
diate action of this kind. A second control applies post-
promulgation. Ordinances are temporary in nature. To become 
permanent, they must be enacted into law within a specified 
period. Without such formal parliamentary approval, ordinanc-
es “cease to exist.”26 This is the third control. These controls 
taken together suggest that parliamentary legislation and 
presidential legislation do not stand on the same footing. More 
importantly, it implies that parliamentary preeminence is still 
part of India’s legislative design. But that is not so. After sixty 
years of constitutional practice these controls are redundant; 
aggressive political conduct and forgiving judicial interpreta-
tions made them so. What was exceptional and temporary is 
now normal and permanent. As a result, India effectively has 
two “Parliaments”—thus, the president acts as an “Alternative 
Parliament.”27 
This Article explains this great Indian alchemy—how and 
why this transformation occurred, and its implications for In-
dia’s parliamentary system. It is divided into four parts. Part I 
tackles the preconditions essential for an ordinance. It argues 
                                                                                                                                     
 21. See, e.g., Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smug-
gling Activities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, No. 6 of 1976, Gazette of In-
dia (Extraordinary), section II(1) (June 16, 1976) . 
 22. See, e.g., Maintenance of Internal Security Ordinance, 1971, No. 5 of 
1971, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (May 7, 1971). 
 23. See, e.g., Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertak-
ings) Ordinance, 1969, No. 8 of 1969, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), sec-
tion II(1) (July 19, 1969). 
 24. See, e.g., Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid (Acquisition of Area) Ordi-
nance, 1990, No. 9 of 1990, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) 
(Oct. 19, 1990). 
 25. See, e.g., Compulsory Deposit Scheme (Income-Tax Payers) Ordinance, 
1974, No. 10 of 1974, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (July 17, 
1974). 
 26. INDIA CONST. art. 123(2)(a). 
 27. The reference to this second Parliament must be understood in a lim-
ited sense. Arguably, parliaments do much more than merely legislate. To 
say that India’s president effectively functions as an alternative Parliament 
is to suggest that the president legislates in the same way that Parliament 
does. 
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that without any judicial oversight, these conditions are largely 
hollow. Part II is about options post-promulgation and offers an 
overview of how Parliament has responded to the 615 ordi-
nances thus far. It then focuses on the legality of repromulgat-
ing ordinances. Part III is an analysis of the final control; 
namely, the requirement that a failed ordinance “ceases to op-
erate.” It argues that by effectively writing off this require-
ment, the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) has com-
pleted this institutional metamorphosis. Finally, Part IV draws 
upon political science literature and comparative experiences 
from Latin America and Europe to explain how this second In-
dian Parliament is different from those commonly associated 
with presidential jurisdictions. 
I. KEEPING PARLIAMENT AWAY: THE CONDITIONS THAT MAKE 
ORDINANCES POSSIBLE 
Two—and only two—conditions must be met before the pres-
ident may promulgate an ordinance. This section discusses 
both of these conditions, assesses their complexities, and revis-
its judicial opinions about them. It argues that the Constitution 
set a low threshold, and the courts lowered it further. As a re-
sult, the conditions are, legally speaking, only about form; sub-
stantively, they are hollow. 
A. Shades of Absence: When Is Parliament “Not in Session”? 
Article 123(1) says that the president may promulgate an or-
dinance except when “both Houses of Parliament are in ses-
sion.” Notice the emphasis on “both Houses.” It suggests that 
ordinances are not meant for occasions when legislation is “in-
stitutionally” possible. Stated differently, Article 123 does not 
establish a parallel legislative process. Rather, it empowers the 
president to enact ordinances when at least one House of Par-
liament is not in session. But when is Parliament “not in ses-
sion?” The question, it turns out, is easier than the answer. 
The Constitution does not prescribe the periods for which the 
two Houses should be in session. It merely states that “six 
months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one ses-
sion and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next ses-
sion.”28 Conventionally, the two Houses meet for three sessions 
                                                                                                                                     
 28. INDIA CONST. art. 85(1) (“The President shall from time to time sum-
mon each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks 
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annually: the “budget session” runs from February to May; the 
“monsoon session” runs from July to September, and the “win-
ter session” runs from November to December.29 While Article 
85 authorizes the president to “summon each House of Parlia-
ment,” in practice, decisions regarding commencement and du-
ration of sessions are made by the Cabinet.30 And once sum-
moned, a House may be brought to a close by several means—it 
may be adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved. 
Adjournment is a break in parliamentary proceedings; it 
postpones the business of a House to another time or date in 
the same session.31 Such breaks may range from short peri-
ods—including just a few hours—to several weeks. In India, 
presiding officers often adjourn Houses when members are dis-
ruptive, or ordinary business cannot be transacted.32 A notice of 
adjournment usually includes a statement of the date and time 
when a House will reassemble, unless it is sine die, in which 
case there is no assurance that the House will meet again dur-
ing that session.33 In contrast, prorogation is a break in par-
liamentary proceedings that signals the end of a session.34 It 
may occur at any time either after adjournment or while a 
House is in session. The decision to prorogue is generally made 
by the Cabinet and notified by the president.35 Once prorogued, 
                                                                                                                                     
fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session 
and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session.”). 
 29. LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT, Composition, Business, and Procedure, in 
HANDBOOK FOR MEMBERS OF LOK SABHA 2 (15th ed. 2009), available at 
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/Members/handbook.aspx [hereinafter LOK 
SABHA HANDBOOK]; see also V.K. AGNIHOTRI, HANDBOOK ON THE WORKING OF 
MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 17–18 (2004). 
 30. For a description of the procedure, see AGNIHOTRI, supra note 29, at 17, 
19–22. 
 31. In the Matter of Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, (2002) 8 S.C.C. 237, ¶ 
52 (India) [hereinafter Reference by President]. 
 32. Unfortunately, this pattern is all too common. See, e.g., Parliament 
Paralysed for Third Consecutive Day, NDTV NEWS (Nov. 24, 2011, 3:56 PM), 
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/Parliament-paralysed-for-third-
consecutive-day-152607; Houses Adjourned over Nandigram Deadlock, 
INDIAN EXPRESS (Nov. 20, 2007, 12:56 AM), 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/houses-adjourned-over-nandigram-
deadlock/241115/. 
 33. LOK SABHA HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 28, 77. 
 34. Id. at 76. 
 35. See generally A.R. MUKHERJEA, PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE IN INDIA 
61–65 (1983). 
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only the president may recall a House back to session; a speak-
er or chairperson of a House is not authorized to do so. This is a 
key difference. If adjourned sine die, a House is still in session 
and the presiding officer may bring it back into session.36 It is 
not so if a House has been prorogued. 
But adjournment and prorogation are similar in one respect. 
Neither adjournment nor prorogation precludes the possibility 
of future sessions and, therefore, unfinished business from a 
prorogued session does not lapse.37 A prorogued House, in other 
words, is inactive but “alive.”38 Finally, dissolution signals the 
end—or “death”—of a particular House, thereby necessitating 
new elections. All pending matters, including bills, lapse on 
dissolution.39 Interestingly, while both the Lower and Upper 
Houses may be adjourned or prorogued, only the Lower House 
can be dissolved in India.40 Once dissolved, it cannot be re-
vived.41 
To summarize, once summoned to meet, both Houses of Par-
liament may be brought to a close in a number of ways. An ad-
journment ends a particular sitting of Parliament. Prorogation 
ends a particular session of Parliament. Dissolution ends that 
Parliament—namely, the Lower House itself.42 These distinc-
tions are important because they determine when an ordinance 
may be promulgated. Recall the temporal limits in Article 
123(1): “at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament 
are in session,” the president may promulgate ordinances.43 
                                                                                                                                     
 36. This has happened on a number of occasions. On May 25, 1987, the 
Lower House was adjourned sine die to mark the end of the budget session. 
But the house was never prorogued. Accordingly, on July 27 it met again for 
the monsoon session, which was, legally speaking, a continuation of its earli-
er session. On July 28, the speaker adjourned the house sine die and on Sep-
tember 3 it was finally prorogued by the president. See STATISTICAL 
HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 10–25. 
 37. Reference by President, supra note 31, ¶ 52. 
 38. Id. ¶ 53. That is unless the prorogation coincides with the House’s 
maximum tenure. 
 39. Id. ¶ 52. 
 40. The Upper House, consistent with Article 83, is a permanent body. 
INDIA CONST. art. 83(1) (“The Council of States shall not be subject to dissolu-
tion, but as nearly as possible one third of the members thereof shall retire as 
soon as may be on the expiration of every second year in accordance with the 
provisions made in that behalf by Parliament by law.”). 
 41. Reference by President, supra note 31, ¶ 52. 
 42. See also MUKHERJEA, supra note 35, at 61–65. 
 43. INDIA CONST. art. 123(1) (emphasis added). 
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Our earlier distinctions make it clear that Parliament is not in 
session when either House stands prorogued or the Lower 
House stands dissolved. Clearly ordinances may be promulgat-
ed then. 
But if Parliament is in sitting, or in session but not in sitting, 
the only way for a Cabinet to promulgate an ordinance is to 
prorogue either House, or dissolve the Lower House. Improper 
as it sounds, Cabinets have resorted to this method—or at-
tempted to do so—on several occasions. The 2006 controversy 
surrounding Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and her alleged “office of prof-
it” is instructive here.44 In June 2004, Prime Minister Manmo-
han Singh and his Cabinet created the National Advisory 
Council (“NAC”)—apparently to oversee the implementation of 
the Common Minimum Program to which the coalition part-
ners of the United Progressive Alliance had agreed. Mrs. Gan-
dhi, as the president of the Congress Party, was appointed its 
chairperson. She enjoyed the rank and status of a cabinet min-
ister and received perks and benefits paid out by the central 
government.45 In March 2006, the National Democratic Alli-
ance-led opposition questioned Mrs. Gandhi’s appointment, al-
leging that it amounted to an “office of profit” under Article 
102—something that disqualified her from membership to ei-
ther House of Parliament.46 Unable to find fault with the oppo-
sition’s legal arguments, the Cabinet secretly came up with a 
draft ordinance to remove Mrs. Gandhi’s disqualifications un-
der the relevant legislation.47 But the two Houses were in ses-
                                                                                                                                     
 44. See generally DAM, supra note 15. 
 45. See The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment Act, 
No. 31 of 2006, INDIA CODE (2006). 
 46. INDIA CONST. art. 102(1)(a).  
A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a 
member of either House of Parliament if he holds any office of profit 
under the Government of India or the Government of any State, oth-
er than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its 
holder. 
Id. Earlier in Day, BJP Spelt Out Her Office of Profit, Indian Express (Mar. 
23, 2006), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/earlier-in-day-bjp-spelt-out-
her-office-of-profit/1040/0; Neena Vyas, Adjournment Aimed at ‘Saving’ 
Sonia, Hindu (Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-
national/adjournment-aimed-at-saving-sonia/article3168149.ece. 
 47. Vyas, supra note 46; R. Venkataraman, Stop Office-of-Profit Axe, UPA 
Gets Ordinance, INDIAN EXPRESS (Mar. 21, 2006, 4:21 AM), 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/to-stop-officeofprofit-axe-upa-gets-
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sion and that created a hurdle. The Cabinet asked the speaker 
to adjourn the Lower House sine die and recommended to the 
president that it be prorogued.48 But the ordinance did not ma-
terialize. An alert piece of reporting by the Indian Express 
made those plans public, and an embarrassed Cabinet back-
tracked.49 Eventually, Mrs. Gandhi resigned, only to be re-
elected, and a later piece of legislation regularized her NAC 
appointment.50 
This sort of legislative maneuvering has an obvious air of im-
propriety. But are there legal limits to how and when the exec-
utive may prorogue parliamentary sessions to make way for 
ordinances? The Madras High Court in In Re Kalyanam 
Veerabhadraya determined that there are not.51 In July 1949, 
the Madras Legislative Assembly was in the process of debat-
ing several amendments to the Madras Maintenance of Public 
Order Act, 1947.52 Despite that, the governor prorogued the 
session and promulgated an ordinance—the Madras Ordi-
nance, 1949—on the grounds that “immediate action was nec-
essary.”53 The petitioners argued that the governor’s action was 
a fraudulent exercise of power: there was no urgency, and the 
legislature was prorogued solely to make an ordinance possi-
ble.54 The High Court rebuffed that claim. 
It is open to the Governor to prorogue the legislature at any 
time he pleases. We do not see anything wrong in the Gover-
                                                                                                                                     
ordinance-/922/; see The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, No. 
10 of 1959, INDIA CODE (1959). 
 48. Uproar in Parliament over Ordinance ‘Shielding’ Sonia, HINDUSTAN 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2006, 4:00 PM), http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-
Feed/NM8/Uproar-in-Parliament-over-ordinance-shielding-Sonia/Article1-
77777.aspx. 
 49. Venkataraman, supra note 47. 
 50. The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, No. 10 of 1959, 
INDIA CODE (1959); Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, A Masterstroke, 23 FRONTLINE, 
Mar. 25–Apr. 7, 2006, available at 
http://hindu.com/fline/fl2306/stories/20060407007212900.htm; Sonia Gandhi 
Runs for Re-election, BBC NEWS (May 8, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4983682.stm; see also Sujay Mehdudia, 
President Kalam Signs Office of Profit Bill, HINDU (Sept. 19, 2006), 
http://www.hindu.com/2006/09/19/stories/2006091922020300.htm. 
 51. In re Kalyanam Veerabhadrayya, A.I.R. 1950 (Mad.) 243, ¶ 21 (1949) 
(India). 
 52. The Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, No. 1 of 1947 (India). 
 53. Madras Ordinance, 1949, No. 1 of 1949 (India). 
 54. In re Kalyanam Veerabhadrayya, supra note 51, ¶ 21. 
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nor proroguing the Assembly and the Council with a view to 
enable himself to issue an Ordinance. The legislature . . . is 
very slow to move in the matter of legislation and if the Gov-
ernor has reasons to believe that immediate action is neces-
sary, it [can] be more expedient to have resort to the power of 
issuing an Ordinance . . . rather than approach the Legisla-
ture for the necessary legislation.55 
In other words, the power to prorogue is absolute; the execu-
tive may invoke it at any time and for any reason. Even if done 
solely to make an ordinance possible—as in the office of profit 
controversy—the High Court seemed to suggest that it too 
would be lawful. 
This absolute reading of prorogation was somewhat disputed 
in State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang.56 The facts of the case are 
peculiar. During the budget session in March 1968, a resolution 
expressing no-confidence in the speaker was moved in the Pun-
jab State Assembly.57 The next day, the speaker declared the 
motion unconstitutional and deemed not to have been moved. 
He then adjourned the Assembly for two months until May 6, 
1968.58 This led to a crisis. The state budget had a March 31 
deadline, but the Assembly stood adjourned until May. With 
the speaker unwilling to resume legislative proceedings, the 
governor prorogued the Assembly and promulgated the Punjab 
Legislature Regulation of Procedure in Relation to Financial 
Business Ordinance, 1968.59 It barred both Houses of the State 
Legislature from being adjourned without consent until the 
completion of the financial business.60 When challenged on the 
ground that the Houses were prorogued solely to make way for 
an ordinance, the Court sided with the governor. “There was no 
abuse of power by him, nor can his action be described as mala 
fide,” Chief Justice Hidayatullah wrote.61 But he hedged on the 
larger question: 
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Whether a Governor will be justified to do this when the Leg-
islature is in session and in the midst of its legislative work is 
a question that does not fall for consideration here. When that 
happens, the motives of the Governor may conceivably be 
questioned on the ground of an alleged want of good faith and 
abuse of constitutional powers.62 
Satya Pal Dang is less sweeping than the view articulated by 
the Madras High Court, and if correct, would imply that presi-
dents (and governors) do not have complete discretion in pro-
roguing Houses. Nonetheless, both decisions and their general 
tenor err on the side of wide discretion and that has stark im-
plications for Article 123. If the decision to prorogue a parlia-
mentary session is entirely—or substantially—within the dis-
cretion of a Cabinet, it follows that the temporal limit in Article 
123 does not impose any meaningful restriction. The executive 
may satisfy the “not in session” requirement simply by prorogu-
ing a House when it is in session. 
B. Whimsically Legal: Measuring Presidential Satisfaction 
The first control has a second leg that must also be met be-
fore Article 123 can be invoked. The president must be satisfied 
“that circumstances exist that render it necessary for him to 
take immediate action.”63 In other words, at least one House of 
Parliament must not be in session, and the president must be 
satisfied that the circumstances demand an immediate parlia-
mentary response. This latter condition—the emphasis on 
“immediate action”—reiterates the idea that the arrangement 
did not establish a parallel Parliament. As mentioned earlier, 
the power to promulgate ordinances is nominally vested in the 
president; in practice, it is exercised by the Cabinet. If the lat-
ter decides that an ordinance is immediately necessary, the 
president promulgates it into law. But such decisions may be 
made for reasons other than the fact that it is, legislatively 
speaking, immediately necessary. The dramatic circumstances 
under which banks were nationalized in 1969 illustrate this. 
When India’s second Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri 
unexpectedly died in office in 1966, the ruling Congress Party 
turned to Mrs. Indira Gandhi to lead the nation. At forty-eight, 
she was young, charismatic, and—as the daughter of India’s 
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longest serving Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru—widely 
admired.64 She led her party to its fourth victory in the General 
Elections in 1967 but with a reduced majority.65 Soon, her posi-
tion became suspect as senior—and more conservative—leaders 
openly defied her.66 In a shrewd move, Mrs. Gandhi allied her-
self with the younger, socialist faction of her party. The clash of 
personalities became ideological as a result and turned in her 
favor.67 She unveiled an aggressive socialist agenda, matching 
it with powerful rhetoric both inside and outside Parliament. 
But an agenda was not enough; Mrs. Gandhi had to act. 
On the evening of July 18, 1969, a senior draftsman from the 
Law Ministry, S. K. Maitra, was ordered by the Prime Minis-
ter’s Secretariat to draft an ordinance nationalizing fourteen of 
India’s biggest commercial banks.68 The matter was top secret, 
and only a handful of bureaucrats were privy to the drafting 
process. Mrs. Gandhi looked through the draft early the next 
morning and made minor modifications.69 Later approved un-
opposed by a Cabinet that had neither seen nor heard about it 
earlier, the ordinance was sent to then Acting President V. V. 
Giri who signed it into law.70 “By a mere stroke of the pen the 
Government [took] control of the deposits of 14 banks, totaling  
. . . nearly 70 percent of the aggregate amount of deposits un-
der the banking system.”71 A day later, Parliament came back 
to session.72 
The Prime Minister’s action invited sharp criticisms. M. R. 
Masani and C. Rajagopalachari, leaders of the free-market 
Swatantra Party, criticized the takeover, and not just for policy 
reasons. They argued that an ordinance a day before Parlia-
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ment was to convene “was immoral.”73 A. B. Vajpayee, then 
president of the conservative Jan Sangh Party, made a similar 
point. He stated that imposing a far-reaching decision on the 
nation “through the backdoor of an ordinance and that too just 
on the eve of the Parliament session is in itself proof that the 
Government is afraid of facing Parliament in a straightforward 
manner.”74 The criticisms mattered little though. As the Times 
of India editorial put it, “the die [was] cast.”75 While ordinances 
in Article 123 are temporary measures that eventually require 
formal parliamentary approval, by 1969, in practice, there was 
clearly no going back after promulgation.76 Ordinances by then 
had acquired a firm quality; once promulgated, it only had the 
effect of tying Parliament’s hand. 
Examined in context, bank nationalization for Mrs. Gandhi 
was a vehicle by which to cement herself as the leader of the 
government and the party.77 Legislative urgency, if any, was 
“political” and tied to machinations within the Congress Party. 
As such, was the reliance on Article 123 justified? Rustom C. 
Cooper, a shareholder in one of the nationalized banks, did not 
think so. He challenged the ordinance in the Supreme Court.78 
He argued that the nationalization ordinance was contrary to 
Article 123 because the president—acting on the advice of the 
Council of Ministers—wrongly came to the conclusion that im-
mediate action was necessary. His larger point was that presi-
dential satisfaction had limits, and ordinances were valid only 
if they were promulgated for the “right” reasons.79 The Attor-
ney General took the contrary view, arguing that the decision 
to promulgate an ordinance was a “matter of high policy” and 
therefore completely immune from judicial review.80 The Union 
of India was “under no obligation to disclose the existence of, or 
to justify the circumstances of the necessity to take immediate 
action,” he insisted.81 The Supreme Court left the matter unde-
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cided. By the time hearings began, the ordinance had already 
become an Act, and questions about presidential satisfaction in 
Article 123 were no longer relevant.82 But the Court’s refusal to 
wade into the issue demonstrated the provision’s potential—
especially the many ends for which it could be invoked. 
The Court shed its reticence in Nagaraj v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh and sided with the executive.83 The governor of the 
southern state of Andhra Pradesh promulgated an ordinance 
reducing the retirement age of public sector employees from 
fifty-eight to fifty-five. The ordinance was challenged, among 
other reasons, on the basis that the governor wrongly—and 
perhaps with improper motives—came to the conclusion that it 
was necessary. The Court rebuffed that argument. A president 
(or governor’s) decision to promulgate an ordinance, it said, 
was immune from judicial review.84 The Court reached that 
conclusion in three steps. First, an ordinance is identical to an 
Act.85 Second, when Parliament enacts legislation, it cannot be 
accused of having done so “for an extraneous purpose.”86 Even 
if the executive, in a given case, has an ulterior motive in in-
troducing a piece of legislation, “that motive cannot render the 
passing of the law mala fide.”87 This kind of “transferred mal-
ice” was “unknown in the field of legislation.”88 The same is 
true of presidents and governors, Chief Justice Chandrachud 
claimed; they alone may decide if an ordinance is necessary. 
This view was repeated in Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh.89 
“The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act,” 
Chief Justice Chandrachud once again wrote, “are for the de-
termination of the legislative authority,” not courts.90 Ordi-
nances are like acts, and thus subject to similar restrictions.91 
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The law regarding presidential satisfaction, therefore, is pre-
cisely what Attorney General Niren De argued for in the Bank 
Nationalization Case.92 The president may promulgate an ordi-
nance for any reason, and that decision is final. The satisfac-
tion is completely subjective and totally immune from any kind 
of judicial scrutiny. Indeed, Cabinets may take to them for per-
sonal, political, or whimsical reasons and courts still would not 
review the validity of such reasons. As seen earlier, Mrs. Gan-
dhi resorted to an ordinance for “personal” reasons. Her au-
thority was under challenge and the ordinance became a vehi-
cle by which to strengthen her position within the Congress 
Party. What other reasons may motivate Cabinets to indulge in 
ordinances? The remainder of this section sketches out a typol-
ogy of motives that can help further an understanding of the 
presidential reasons underlying ordinances. 
First, as mentioned earlier, ordinances may be promulgated 
for personal reasons. Such “preferential” ordinances are princi-
pally about the partisan interests of ministers, individually or 
collectively, or the party to which the Cabinet belongs. Both 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s bank ordinance and the proposed, though 
ultimately not promulgated, 2006 ordinance aimed at remedy-
ing Mrs. Sonia Gandhi’s disqualification are obvious examples. 
But they are not the only ones. Perhaps the most egregious of 
such partisan ordinances was attempted in 1996. The Nara-
simha Rao Cabinet was in its “caretaker phase” and the next 
general election was two months away.93 The cabinet drafted 
two ordinances.94 The first reduced the campaigning period 
from three to two weeks.95 The second extended the benefits of 
India’s reservation policy to an estimated 12 million lower 
caste Christians concentrated in southern India.96 But Presi-
dent S. D. Sharma declined to promulgate them; he felt that 
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“they did not pass the test of constitutional propriety.”97 Per-
haps these ordinances were “necessary” only in the sense that 
they benefitted the ruling party or persons therein. 
Second, cabinets may resort to ordinances to further specific 
policy preferences that do not enjoy parliamentary support. In-
deed, they may do so because they lack majority support. These 
“anti-majoritarian” ordinances are different from partisan or-
dinances; they do not benefit ministers, individually or collec-
tively, or the ruling party specifically. Instead, they further a 
cabinet’s preferences, albeit ones that lack majority support. 
The original and the repromulgated versions of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001 (“POTO”) are good examples. The 
Vajpayee Cabinet mooted the idea of an anti-terrorism legisla-
tion in the aftermath of the attacks in New York City in 2001. 
Some members of the ruling NDA opposed it. They felt that 
such a law could target India’s religious minorities and under-
mine press freedom.98 Fully aware that the proposal enjoyed 
insufficient support in Parliament, the cabinet pressed on with 
an ordinance.99 Later on, still unable to persuade its coalition 
partners, the cabinet repromulgated a slightly altered version 
once the relevant session concluded.100 That a parliamentary 
majority had rebuffed the need for such a law, even if implied-
ly, did not matter. The ordinance mechanism became an alibi 
through which to enact a piece of legislation despite majority 
support against it. 
Occasionally, cabinets may promulgate anti-majoritarian or-
dinances not by choice but under “compulsion.” Consider the 
1994 controversy involving India’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”). India became a founding member 
of the WTO in 1995 and simultaneously signed the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPs”).101 This latter agreement mandated several changes 
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to India’s intellectual property laws—especially patent legisla-
tion—to meet the new obligations.102 The Narasimha Rao Cab-
inet had more than eight months during which to evolve a po-
litical consensus in favor of these changes. Yet it did nothing. 
Later, faced with an impending deadline, the cabinet took the 
easy way out. It promulgated an ordinance—The Patents 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1994—on December 31, 1994, pro-
claiming in the preamble that “it [had] become necessary to 
amend the Patents Act, 1970 in conformity with the obligations 
under the [TRIPs] Agreement.”103 The move angered the oppo-
sition.104 To J. S. Reddy of the Janata Dal, it “was a classic case 
of misuse of a constitutional provision,” and “a nasty conspiracy 
to confront Parliament with a fait accompli.”105 The cabinet had 
foreknowledge of the impending legislative void, and if any-
thing, the urgency was orchestrated by inaction. As the Times 
of India editorial put it, rather than make any conciliatory 
moves, the government “gambled on the opposition supporting 
it to save face abroad.”106 Perhaps it was “necessary” only to 
avoid a parliamentary defeat. This was later borne out. The 
ordinance was introduced in Parliament in March 1995 only to 
be indirectly rejected by the Upper House.107 
Third, occasionally cabinets, especially minority cabinets, 
may rely on ordinances to legislate systematically. Their mi-
nority status implies that they do not have the numeric support 
to muscle legislation through Parliament. Thus, Article 123 
acts as the crutch through which to churn out new legislation. 
This is different from the second reason for promulgating an 
ordinance; in the earlier case, the cabinet had a working major-
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ity in Parliament but lacked support for a specific piece of legis-
lation. With minority cabinets, the lack of support is more gen-
eral, and the reliance on ordinances more systematic. We may 
refer to them as “substitutive ordinances”; the mechanism al-
most functions like a parallel Parliament. 
H. D. Deve Gowda and Inder K. Gujral and their respective 
cabinets best exemplify this. As the leader of the minority 
United Front coalition, Deve Gowda became India’s eleventh 
Prime Minister and held office between June 1996 and April 
1997. He promulgated twenty-three ordinances in those eleven 
months.108 Inder K. Gujral took over as Prime Minister after 
Deve Gowda resigned, and ran another minority government. 
He also held office for eleven months and was responsible for 
another twenty-three ordinances.109 The two cabinets jointly 
promulgated forty-six ordinances during their twenty-two 
months in office. In the same period, they legislated no more 
than sixty-one acts. When put side by side, these figures reveal 
the extent to which ordinances were systematically used to leg-
islate without Parliament. Ordinances were “necessary” for 
these cabinets, though not in the sense of Article 123. Rather, 
they filled a political void brought about by fractured electoral 
verdicts and the cabinets’ inability to develop a network of sup-
port from parliamentary friends and foes alike. 
Fourth, occasionally cabinets may rely on ordinances simply 
because they are convenient. They are convenient in the sense 
that the ordinance in question is a relatively uncontroversial 
one—and unlikely to generate objections. We may refer to them 
as “convenient ordinances.” The creation of the National Hu-
man Rights Commission (“NHRC”) is a good example. The 
NHRC is a statutory body with the authority to inquire into 
allegations of human rights abuse, review legislative and con-
stitutional safeguards, study international treaties and conven-
tions, and promote human rights literacy in India.110 Yet an 
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ordinance was used to establish it.111 Senior officials boasted of 
the law’s deliberated status while explaining its salient fea-
tures at a news conference. It was “an entirely new kind of leg-
islation,” they claimed, “drafted after sixteen months of intense 
discussions.”112 “All shades of public opinion” were heard, in-
cluding consultations with federal ministries and state gov-
ernments.113 If true, these expansive briefings take away the 
very justification for the ordinance. Something written, re-
viewed, and revised over a period of sixteen months cannot 
plausibly claim the mantle of urgency. Perhaps the ordinance 
was “necessary” only in the sense that it was convenient and 
assured of a parliamentary majority in due course. 
As this typology suggests, a wide variety of motives propel 
ordinances to life. By favoring an understanding of “necessity” 
not grounded in Article 123, these motives undermine the basic 
norm that primary legislation must satisfy certain representa-
tive, numeric, and deliberative criteria. But more importantly, 
they reveal the hollowness of the preconditions. Recall that two 
conditions must be satisfied before ordinances may be promul-
gated. At least one House of Parliament must not be in session, 
and the president should be satisfied that circumstances make 
it necessary to do so. But these, we now know, are mere formal-
ities. A functioning Parliament may be prorogued at any time 
for any reason, and the cabinet may recommend an ordinance 
for any reason at all. As a result, there are no ex ante con-
straints on invoking Article 123. Effectively, there are two dis-
tinct sources of primary legislation in India—the Parliament 
and the president. They function independently but also often 
cross purposes with one another. 
II. KEEPING ORDINANCES IN EFFECT: A ROGUE METHOD 
EXPLAINED 
The argument that there are two distinct sources of primary 
legislation does not necessarily imply that there are two Par-
liaments. Whether presidential and parliamentary legislation 
equate to one another will depend on events post-promulgation. 
Ordinances under Article 123 are temporary provisions of law. 
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They remain in effect for six weeks from the day the two Hous-
es reconvene and must be converted into an act within this du-
ration.114 This is a critical hurdle; the “Two Parliaments” ar-
gument cannot succeed without overcoming it. There are two 
mechanisms by which to overcome this hurdle. This section 
discusses the empirical record of ordinances post-promulgation 
and focuses on the first mechanism; namely, repromulgation. 
A. What Happens after Promulgation: Five Possibilities 
Once promulgated, every ordinance, in keeping with Article 
123(2), must be laid “before both Houses.”115 Four outcomes are 
largely possible at this stage. First, the ordinance may become 
an Act through the normal legislative procedure. This is the 
best-case scenario from the cabinet’s point of view. It must be 
done within six weeks of the reassembly of the two Houses.116 
Second, the ordinance may be put to vote, but “disapproved” by 
one or both Houses. It is the worst-case scenario from the cabi-
net’s point of view. The ordinance immediately “ceases to oper-
ate” in such a case.117 Third, the cabinet may decide against 
putting the ordinance to a vote at all. That is to say, it may let 
the ordinance “lapse.” Lastly, the cabinet may withdraw an or-
dinance.118 These four possibilities fall into two broad catego-
ries. The first outcome is the successful one; the ordinance be-
comes an act. Though for different reasons, the other three out-
comes share an unsuccessful quality. In each of those cases, an 
ordinance ends as an ordinance; it does not become an act. Par-
enthetically, it may be noted that a fifth outcome is also possi-
ble. If a cabinet so chooses, it may repromulgate an unsuccess-
ful ordinance after the reassembled Houses are no longer in 
session. But a repromulgated ordinance is still an ordinance 
and will eventually meet one of the four outcomes mentioned 
earlier. 
Table A lists the ways in which Parliament has responded to 
ordinances thus far. Of the 615 ordinances, 478 (77.7%) “suc-
ceeded;” they became acts. Of the “unsuccessful” ones, seventy-
five (12.1%) expired (or lapsed); fifty-nine (9.5%) were reprom-
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ulgated; and two (.003%) were withdrawn.119 These numbers, 
when plotted by decade, show a marginal decline in the per-
centage of successful ordinances. The 1950s had the lowest 
number of ordinances and nearly the highest conversion rate: 
fifty-two ordinances were promulgated and forty-eight of them 
became acts (92.3%). The success rate was 92.5% in the 1960s, 
90.3% in the 1970s, 89.2% in the 1980s, and 77.7% in the 
2000s. The 1990s is the outlier. Of the 196 ordinances promul-
gated during that decade, only 107 (54.5%) became acts. As 
many as eighty-nine failed, of which thirty-six (18.3%) expired 
and another fifty-three (27%) were repromulgated. These low 
rates of success were brought about by poor performances in 
several years. For example, in 1995, of the fifteen ordinances 
promulgated only six became acts. The performance in 1996 
was even worse: thirty-two ordinances were promulgated and 
only nine became acts. Similarly, in 1997, thirty-one ordinanc-
es were promulgated and only eleven became acts. Taken to-
gether, the 1990s, in contrast to the 1950s, had the most num-
ber of ordinances and the worst conversion rate. 
 
Table A. Parliamentary Responses to Ordinances 
 
 Acts Disapproved Lapsed Withdrawn Repromulgated 
1952–1959 48 – 03 01 – 
1960–1969 62 – 05 – – 
1970–1979 122 – 12 01 – 
1980–1989 83 – 10 – – 
1990–1999 107 – 36 – 53 
2000–2009 56 – 10 – 06 
 
Our focus must be on repromulgated ordinances. Repromul-
gation is the method by which a cabinet may reintroduce an 
ordinance upon its lapse, withdrawal, or rejection, and there-
fore is an important mechanism by which to overcome the 
“temporary” hurdle identified previously. As Table A shows, 
until the 1990s, the established practice was against repromul-
gating ordinances. In fact, ordinances had never been reprom-
ulgated at the federal level prior to the early 1990s. But that 
established practice quickly succumbed to political expediency 
when fractured parliamentary verdicts and minority cabinets 
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became the norm. Of the 196 ordinances promulgated in the 
1990s, as many as fifty-three (27%) were repromulgated, in-
cluding some that were promulgated twice or more. Though the 
trend began in 1992, repromulgation assumed hideous propor-
tions in 1996 and 1997. There were thirty-two ordinances in 
1996; of those ordinances, nineteen were repromulgated or re-
peatedly repromulgated. Similarly, there were thirty-one ordi-
nances in 1997; sixteen were repromulgated and at least seven 
were repromulgated twice. Incidentally, they all came from mi-
nority cabinets.120 
B. Repeated Promulgations: The First Step Toward “Two Par-
liaments”? 
Note that Article 123 says nothing about repromulgation. Its 
silence raises two important questions. Is repromulgation val-
id? Second, are there limits to the number of times an ordi-
nance may be repromulgated? An affirmative answer to the 
first question and a negative answer to the second question will 
support the argument that there are “Two Parliaments.” It 
would imply that the second control—the requirement that an 
ordinance be properly enacted as an act—is an empty one. A 
cabinet may repeatedly repromulgate an ordinance to confer on 
it a kind of permanence normally accorded to acts. 
Between 1967 and 1981, the State of Bihar in eastern India 
promulgated 256 ordinances that “were kept alive for periods 
ranging between one and fourteen years by repromulgation 
from time to time.”121 Repromulgated mechanically and strate-
gically, the authorities ensured that the ordinances did not out-
live their prescribed tenure.122 In D. C. Wadhwa v. State of Bi-
har,123 the Supreme Court concluded that the practice was, 
generally speaking, unconstitutional. Four steps made up most 
of the Court’s reasoning: (a) the lawmaking function in the 
Constitution is entrusted to the legislature; (b) it is contrary to 
democratic norms that the executive should have the power to 
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make law; (c) the power to issue ordinances to tide over emer-
gent situations is exceptional and, therefore, must be limited in 
point of time; and (d) a contrary view—of allowing the execu-
tive to usurp legislative functions—is opposed to India’s “con-
stitutional scheme.”124 The Court’s conclusion, though defensi-
ble, is far from uniform. On two separate occasions the Patna 
High Court interpreted Article 213 (the state version of Article 
123) in favor of repromulgative powers.125 Referring to the 
permissibility of repromulgation, in Mathura Prasad Singh v. 
State of Bihar126 Singh J. concluded “it is not for the Court to 
declare such an Ordinance ultra vires on this score.” If a state 
is ruled by successive ordinances, the Legislature may disap-
prove of the ordinances or the electorate may disapprove of the 
conduct of its accredited representatives in promulgating the 
ordinances and reject them at the next poll.127 
Two aspects in D. C. Wadhwa have attracted attention and 
criticism. First, there was a mismatch between the Court’s hor-
tatory denunciation of the practice and its formal order. At var-
ious points, Chief Justice Bhagwati was scathing in his as-
sessment of the repromulgative practice. He considered the 
“enormity of the situation . . . startling” at one point;128 else-
where, he anointed the practice as “nothing short of usurpa-
tion,”129 a clear “subverting of the democratic process,”130 a 
“subterfuge,”131 “reprehensible,”132 and finally, “a fraud on the 
Constitution.”133 And yet, this litany of linguistic censures did 
not translate into meaningful remedies. Except for invalidating 
one of the three ordinances specifically under challenge, the 
Supreme Court fell back on “hope and trust that such practice 
shall not be continued in the future.”134 It said or did nothing 
about the endemic practice that had otherwise taken root in 
Bihar. The narrative of subversion, subterfuge, and fraud, 
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Upendra Baxi says, was inconsistent with the Court’s eventual 
“hope and trust” kind of order.135 “Both ‘hope’ and ‘trust’ are 
singularly misplaced,” he argues, “in a context where a state 
has usurped unconstitutionally the power of the elected repre-
sentatives of the people.”136 
Second, the Court’s conclusion that repromulgation is uncon-
stitutional leaves certain matters unclear. For example, is 
repromulgation always unconstitutional? That is unlikely: 
Chief Justice Bhagwati himself listed circumstances in which 
the executive may be compelled to repromulgate an ordinance. 
Of course, there may be a situation where it may not be pos-
sible for the Government to introduce and push through in 
the Legislature a Bill containing the same provisions as in the 
Ordinance, because the Legislature may have too much legis-
lative business . . . or the time at the disposal of the Legisla-
ture . . . may be short, and in that event, the Governor may 
legitimately find that it is necessary to repromulgate the Or-
dinance.137 
What this exception suggests is that the Court merely invali-
dated mechanical repromulgation of ordinances, not repromul-
gation per se. Promulgation (or repromulgation) as an exercise 
of original legislative powers requires an application of mind, 
not just clerical approval. Repromulgation, in other words, 
would be valid if the original emergent conditions persist 
alongside adequate reasons for failing to legislate an ordinance 
into law. Unlike promulgation, the validity of repromulgation, 
therefore, is predicated both on the persistence of emergent 
conditions and the availability of reasons as to why an ordi-
nance was not transacted in the intervening legislative session. 
It is noteworthy that the Court imposed no restriction on re-
peated repromulgations; if it could be done once, it could be 
done several times. 
Our focus must then be on “adequate reasons” that would 
justify repromulgation. Chief Justice Bhagwati pointed out 
two. First, if the volume of legislative business in the interven-
ing session were such that the cabinet failed to push a bill 
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through, repromulgation would be acceptable.138 Second, if time 
were too short during an intervening session to enact an ordi-
nance into law, repromulgation would also be acceptable.139 
Both these options, to some extent, belie the fundamental re-
quirement that an emergency situation must exist for reprom-
ulgation. If a legislative emergency truly persists, with a make-
do ordinance brought in to tide over it, why should such a mat-
ter be treated with low priority? If Parliament does not priori-
tize ordinance-related matters for reasons of volume or dura-
tion, that itself may be a ground to doubt the existence of 
emergency conditions. 
Unsurprisingly, the exceptions were greeted with skepticism. 
A. G. Noorani was personal in his criticism: “When Justice P. 
N. Bhagwati retired as the Chief Justice of India even those 
who had made it their vocation in recent years to extol his 
qualities had to concede that when it came to great power, ti-
midity was his watchword.”140 The exemption carved out by 
Chief Justice Bhagwati, Noorani thought, was “wholly gratui-
tous and rob[bed] the judgment of merit and value.”141 For him, 
“[i]t was a case of interpretation and the exception, based on 
pure legislative convenience, derive[d] no sanction from Article 
213.”142 It was, as he put it, “devoid of any justification.”143 Anil 
Nauriya, in his more measured analysis, pointed out the poten-
tial incoherence of the propositions.144 Given that the decision 
outlawed “only successive repromulgations indulged in as a 
practice,” Nauriya argued that the Court had in effect upheld 
three contradictory propositions. One, the subjective satisfac-
tion of the president as to whether an ordinance is necessary 
remains outside judicial scrutiny. Two, in some cases reprom-
ulgation may be constitutionally justifiable, and finally, that 
successive repromulgation would be bad.145 If the first and sec-
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ond propositions are valid, the third does not stand up to scru-
tiny. 
If the Supreme Court insists on a set of exceptions to the 
general rule against repromulgation, what other reasons apart 
from those in D. C. Wadhwa might be valid? Take the case of 
POTO, the anti-terror legislation previously mentioned. Sup-
port for the ordinance was low from the beginning and even the 
government’s coalition partners were hesitant.146 But the 
Vajpayee Cabinet repromulgated the ordinance with few 
changes.147 That a parliamentary majority had impliedly re-
buffed the need for such legislation hardly mattered. Is the ab-
sence of legislative support an adequate reason for repromul-
gating an ordinance? D. C. Wadhwa provides no guidelines in 
this regard. It is unclear if Chief Justice Bhagwati’s exceptions 
should be read as a closed category.148 The Delhi High Court, it 
should be mentioned, chose to read the exceptions widely. In 
Gyanendra Kumar v. Union of India,149 the Court used the 
Wadhwa exceptions to uphold the validity of ten repromulgated 
ordinances. The Solicitor General argued that the ordinances 
were tabled in the two Houses, but other pressing and urgent 
matters meant that the bills could not be taken up for a full 
discussion.150 The High Court accepted that claim without any 
further inquiry. Left unsaid was the fact that the minority cab-
inet did not have the requisite number in the two Houses to 
properly legislate the ordinances into acts. 
The second control in Article 123 has to do with parliamen-
tary approval: an ordinance does not become permanent unless 
Parliament converts it into an act. But the possibility of 
repromulgation has watered down that control. To be sure, 
repromulgation is nominally unconstitutional. But it is also the 
beneficiary of a generous exception; cabinets merely need to 
summon the alibi of two Houses burdened with other “urgent 
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matters” to invoke it. This way cabinets have an alternative 
means by which to make ordinances permanent. Parliamentary 
Acts are permanent from the very beginning unless otherwise 
stated. Ordinances too are permanent, but with the president’s 
periodic intervention. As such, we are well on our way to estab-
lishing the “Two Parliaments” argument. The next section ex-
plores the second aspect of permanence, which has to do with 
the effect of failed ordinances. 
III. SUCCESS IN FAILURE: THE AFTERLIFE OF FAILED 
ORDINANCES 
The previous sections have shown that the president in India 
may promulgate an ordinance effectively at any time for any 
reason. Such an ordinance may be made effectively permanent 
simply by repromulgating it repeatedly. But Article 123 has a 
third control, and we must consider its effectiveness before 
rendering a final verdict. It has to do with failed ordinances. 
Since Parliament may reject an ordinance, some ordinances do 
not become acts. Also, the president may withdraw an ordi-
nance, or it may simply lapse. In all such cases, what happens 
to the validity of actions taken while the ordinances were in 
force? 
Article 123(2) says that failed ordinances “cease to oper-
ate.”151 In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Bose,152 the Supreme 
Court turned its attention to this clause: What does it mean to 
say that an ordinance “ceases to operate?” The petitioner chal-
lenged the results of an election to a local municipal body on 
the ground that the election did not comply with procedural 
requirements. The High Court agreed and invalidated the re-
sult. Alarmed by the possibility that elections to other munici-
pal bodies may also be invalidated, the governor promulgated 
an ordinance.153 Electoral laws were retrospectively amended 
to override the High Court’s reasoning and judgment. But the 
ordinance did not become permanent; the State Assembly 
failed to convert it into an act.154 Consequently, the ordinance 
lapsed and ceased to operate. Did this lapse revive the High 
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Court’s earlier decision invalidating the elections—the very 
thing that led the governor to promulgate the ordinance? The 
Supreme Court said no. And the Court’s reasoning has im-
portant implications for the “Two Parliaments” argument. 
The Court began by looking at the effect of temporary acts. 
Based on a quick survey of three English decisions,155 Chief 
Justice Chandrachud concluded that no inflexible rule could be 
laid down regarding the effects of a temporary act.156 As he put 
it, at least in some cases, “repeal effected by a temporary act 
would be permanent and would endure even after the expira-
tion of the temporary act.”157 The precise nature of the effect, 
he said, “must depend upon the nature of the right or obliga-
tion resulting from the provisions of the temporary act and up-
on their character whether the said right and liability are en-
during or not.”158 And keeping in mind “the object of the Ordi-
nance and the right created by the validating provisions,” the 
Court concluded that it “must be held to endure and last even 
after the expiry of the Ordinance.”159  
The reasoning was reiterated in Venkata Reddy v. State of 
Andhra Pradesh.160 The governor promulgated the Andhra 
Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers Ordi-
nance, 1984, to abolish the post of part-time Village Officers 
and to create a new category of posts referred to as “Village As-
sistants.”161 The ordinance, despite a series of repromulgations, 
lapsed; the State Assembly refused to enact it. The petitioner, 
previously a part-time Village Officer, argued that the Ordi-
nance having lapsed, his earlier post stood revived. The Su-
preme Court rejected that claim. Chief Justice Chandrachud 
once again came to the conclusion that failed ordinances do not 
become void retrospectively.162 Article 123(2) says that a failed 
ordinance “shall cease to operate,” and that, he said, “only 
means that it should be treated as being effective till it ceases 
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to operate on the happening of the events mentioned in [the 
provision].”163 The part-time posts stood abolished on the date 
on which the Ordinance was promulgated, and its effects are 
irreversible except by new legislation.164 Parliament and State 
Legislatures are not powerless to undo the effects of failed or-
dinances; but only new acts can achieve such corrections with 
retrospective effect. Chief Justice Chandrachud concluded that 
new acts are the only way to revive “closed or completed trans-
actions” generated under a failed ordinance.165 
The implications are stark. The reasoning elevates the status 
of ordinances to temporary acts. That is, an ordinance is an act 
with a sunset clause. And because the Court interprets the ef-
fects of failed ordinances through the prism of temporary acts, 
it has the implied effect of privileging presidential legislation 
over parliamentary legislation. In Venkata Reddy, for example, 
the post of part-time Village Officer was created by an act.166 
The ordinance that abolished it lapsed. But it still generated a 
permanent state of affairs. Only a new act, the Court says, can 
revise this new state of affairs. This implies that the president 
may negate statutorily conferred rights and duties merely by 
issuing ordinances. Their effects, however, can be undone only 
by acts of Parliament. 
Consider what this means for repeal by an ordinance. Par-
liament, in the exercise of its legislative power, may repeal leg-
islation; ordinances, therefore, may also do so.167 Let us assume 
that an ordinance repeals an existing piece of legislation but 
lapses.168 Does that lapse revive the repealed act? A temporary 
act on its expiry does not revive the repealed law unless specif-
ically provided for in the act itself.169 And if an ordinance is 
constitutionally equivalent to a temporary act, as the Supreme 
Court says it is, a lapse will have no effect. The repealed act 
would remain permanently repealed unless subsequently re-
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vived by a new act. The implication is obvious: the president 
acting independently can permanently repeal a piece of parlia-
mentary legislation. 
This manner of reasoning has effectively undone the third 
control—the requirement that a failed ordinance must “cease to 
operate.” To Chief Justice Chandrachud, the cessation re-
quirement meant that an ordinance “should be treated as being 
effective till it ceases to operate on the happening of the events 
mentioned in [the provision].”170 In other words, all actions 
taken during the period when an ordinance is in force remain 
valid forever. In Bhupendra Bose, the petitioner’s electoral loss 
remained permanent.171 Similarly, in Venkata Reddy the failed 
ordinance permanently destroyed the part-time posts for some.  
What this means is that an ordinance, when it ‘ceases to op-
erate,’ does not really cease to operate. Take the case of a uni-
versity. In India, a university can only be established by an 
act.172 An ordinance therefore can also establish a university.173 
Let us assume that the ordinance lapses months later. In addi-
tion, let us assume that the university had achieved several 
things in those six months. It may have, for example, put in 
place an academic infrastructure sufficient to commence func-
tioning, secured approvals for some courses, completed the first 
round of admissions, and started introductory classes. What 
would be the legal effect of this lapse? Nothing, if the Supreme 
Court is correct. The university will continue as if the ordi-
nance is permanently valid. 
The dramatic implications of this interpretation are made 
clear by the case of Mohammad Afroze and his prosecution un-
der the dreaded POTO. Afroze was arrested in Mumbai on Oc-
tober 2001 and initially charged with robbery.174 The police lat-
er claimed that he was an al-Qaida agent; he had been conspir-
ing to crash a plane into the British House of Commons.175 To 
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unearth the details of what the Mumbai police referred to as an 
“international conspiracy,” senior officers went to Australia, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States for further ‘‘inves-
tigations.”176 However, less than four weeks after he was for-
mally charged, the public prosecutor reversed his position. He 
requested to the trial court that the POTO charges be 
dropped.177 There was no evidence to prosecute the accused un-
der that ordinance. That same day Scotland Yard categorically 
dismissed claims of any plot to attack the British Parlia-
ment.178 With no corroborating evidence to back up Afroze’s so-
called confession, the special prosecutor in the case admitted to 
a “bona fide error of judgment” in applying the POTO.179 Afroze 
was charged under the POTO at a time when there was a real 
possibility that the Vajpayee Cabinet would fail to translate 
the ordinance into an act for a second time. What if the ordi-
nance had failed a second time? It would have made no differ-
ence for Mohammad Afroze. As senior counsel, P.R. Vakil right-
ly pointed out that the cabinet’s failure to enact POTO into an 
act would not have affected cases already under way.180 Afroze, 
in other words, could be arrested, tried, and even sentenced to 
life in prison or death in pursuance of presidential legislation, 
so long as the process began while the ordinance was still in 
force. None of this unfolded because the police retracted their 
claims. However, if the Vajpayee Cabinet had failed to get 
POTO enacted and the police had persisted with their original 
charges, the invasive potential of presidential legislation would 
have come into sharp focus. 
The third control in Article 123 has endured a common fate. 
Like the previous two, the control is in the provision but effec-
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tively not part of it. Under existing interpretations, a failed or-
dinance retains its legal rigor, and functions as if it is legisla-
tion proper. As such, parliamentary preeminence, it has to be 
said, is no longer part of India’s legislative design. 
IV. PRESIDENTIAL PREEMINENCE: NOTES FROM COMPARATIVE 
DESIGN 
Effectively, India’s president may promulgate any law at any 
time for any reason. When promulgated, such laws are perma-
nent. That presidents should have such extensive legislative 
powers in an otherwise parliamentary system is something of 
an anomaly. But such arrangements are not uncommon in 
presidential systems. Jurisdictions in Eastern and Western 
Europe, Africa, and Latin America frequently endow their pres-
idents with a range of legislative—or, decree—powers.181 This 
penultimate section offers a bird’s eye view of decree powers in 
presidential systems, and situates the Indian experience within 
the broader literature. 
John Carey and Matthew Shugart’s edited volume on decree 
authority is perhaps the most comprehensive comparative 
treatment of the subject.182 Ten contributors assessed the evo-
lution and exercise of such powers in eight jurisdictions and, in 
the process, tested a set of hypotheses offered by the editors. 
Four of those jurisdictions are Latin American (Argentina, 
Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela), while two are West European 
(Italy and France). Russia and the United States made up the 
remaining two. With the exception of Italy and France, the rest 
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are thoroughly presidential systems and that fact colored the 
prism through which the contributors presented and evaluated 
their arguments. 
Carey and Shugart offer a two-by-two matrix to explain the 
various ways in which presidential decree authority can be 
constitutionally entrenched.183 They focus on two aspects: per-
manence and timing. Are decrees permanent? Do they come 
into effect immediately? These two variables generate four pos-
sibilities, as shown below.184 
 
  Decree becomes permanent law? 
    YES   NO   
       
Russia (Art. 90)  Brazil ‘88 (Art. 62) 
  YES Peru ‘93 (Art. 118:19) Italy (Art. 77) 
Decree in effect Colombia ‘91 (Art. 215) Colombia ‘91 (Art. 213) 
immediately?  Chile ‘89 (Art. 32: 22) France (Art. 16) 
 
  NO Ecuador (Art. 65) NA 
   France (Art. 49:3) 
 
Carey and Shugart argue that Russia, Peru, Colombia, and 
Chile are examples of the strongest possibility for presidential 
decree authority.185 Presidential decrees in these jurisdictions 
are permanent and they enjoy immediate effect—the “prototyp-
ical” decree authority.186 Because they are permanent, decrees 
can be parliamentarily undone only through contrary legisla-
tion. The immediate effect of the decrees means that the legis-
lative branch has no influence over them prior to their promul-
gation; parliamentary response, if any, is always ex post. How-
ever, such powers often come with some additional limits. Arti-
cle 90 in Russia’s Constitution, for example, authorizes the 
president to issue “edicts and regulations” provided they do 
“not conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
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and federal laws.”187 Similarly, in Peru, the president can exer-
cise such power only “on economic and financial matters, when 
so required by the national interest.”188 While prototypical de-
cree authority means that there are two distinct paths to pri-
mary legislation, parliament and the president do not always 
enjoy similar legislative standing. 
A second, and somewhat less strong, possibility is what Carey 
and Shugart refer to as “provisional” decree authority, whereby 
decrees take immediate effect but lapse after some designated 
period unless ratified by the legislature.189 Article 62 in Brazil’s 
Constitution, for example, provides that presidential decrees 
shall lapse after sixty days unless “converted into law” by Con-
gress.190 In neighboring Argentina, the Chief of the Ministerial 
Cabinet must personally submit, within ten days, promulgated 
decrees to the Joint Standing Committee of Congress for its 
consideration.191 The Committee must make a report to both 
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Houses of Congress where it is immediately discussed.192 
Whether a ratification requirement limits a president’s ability 
to initiate long-term change depends in part on the legality of 
reissuing such decrees. If presidents are authorized to reprom-
ulgate decrees, legislative opposition to such measures may not 
mean much. However, the effectiveness of the ratification re-
quirement also depends on “clean-up costs.”193 If it is dispropor-
tionately costly to undo presidential initiatives, legislatures 
may ratify them despite their opposition to such measures.194 
Therefore, depending on how and why decrees are issued (and 
reissued), countries with provisional decree authority may, in 
effect, function like those with prototypical decree authority. 
A third and still less strong possibility is what Carey and 
Shugart refer to as “delayed” decree authority.195 As the name 
suggests, such decrees do not take immediate effect. Instead, 
they become permanent law in the absence of legislative ac-
tion.196 This arrangement offers the legislative branch an op-
portunity to prohibit decrees from coming into effect or to alter 
their content before authorizing them. The scrutiny, if any, is 
ex ante. In Ecuador, the president can propose legislation by 
declaring it “urgent,” and if the National Assembly fails to act 
within thirty days, the decree becomes law.197 The Assembly, 
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 193. EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 12. 
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nonetheless, retains the competence to amend or repeal such 
decrees at a later point in time.198 Under Ecuadorian rules, the 
president may send only one “urgent” decree to the Assembly 
at a time.199 Similarly, France’s guillotine procedure may also 
be read as an example of delayed decree authority. There, if 
parliament rejects the executive’s proposal, then the govern-
ment falls; but if parliament takes no action, the decree be-
comes law.200 Consistent with France’s semi-presidential ar-
rangement, the authority over the guillotine is vested in the 
French premier rather than the president.201 The effectiveness 
of delaying the implementation of decrees depends, in part, on 
legislators’ willingness to challenge the president (or the par-
liamentary head). Because an affirmative vote is required to 
prevent an executive measure from becoming law, legislators 
can “authorize” a decree simply by refusing to act on it.202 In 
such cases, delayed decree authority can effectively transform 
into prototypical decree authority. 
Such a transformation is evident in India. India’s Article 123, 
in its original form, conferred “provisional” decree authority.203 
Ordinances come into effect immediately but lapse after a spec-
ified duration unless properly enacted by Parliament.204 In its 
applied form, however, Article 123 effectively functions as a 
prototypical authority; a combination of the constitutional text, 
political context, and judicial subtext made this alchemy possi-
ble. First, ordinances come into effect immediately. Textually, 
they can be promulgated only when either House of Parliament 
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is not in session. However, this limitation does not apply in 
practice.205 Second, lapsed ordinances may be repromulgated, 
thereby conferring quasi-permanence on such legislation. 
While the Supreme Court has declared such practice nominally 
unconstitutional, it also carved out wide exceptions. Those ex-
ceptions make it legal to repromulgate ordinances endlessly. 
There are effectively no limits on the number of times ordi-
nances can be repromulgated. Third, recall that prototypical 
decree authority, as Carey and Shugart claimed, often comes 
with substantive restrictions. In Russia, for example, the pres-
ident may issue “edicts” only to the extent that they do not con-
travene federal laws.206 Similarly, in Peru, the president may 
invoke this authority only in specified matters.207 In India, 
however, there are no subject matter limitations. Article 123(3) 
makes this clear: “If and so far as an Ordinance under this ar-
ticle makes any provision which Parliament would not under 
this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void.”208 In 
other words, the president may promulgate an ordinance on 
any subject matter on which Parliament is competent to enact 
legislation. Taken together, these attributes suggest that India 
functions as a prototypical decree regime. There are two par-
liaments in other words  with the president acting as a parallel 
parliament. More importantly, these attributes suggest that 
India’s prototypical arrangement is one of the strongest in the 
world, much stronger than many in presidential systems. 
Prototypical decree authority is commonly associated with 
unilateral presidential action and, occasionally, constitutional 
breakdowns. In Russia, provisions for an independently elected 
president and decree authority were first introduced in 1991.209 
Almost immediately after taking office on July 20, 1991, Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin invoked the provision to ban, among other 
things, “political activity” within state institutions during office 
hours.210 While he justified the decree as an attempt to ensure 
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“equal rights of political parties,” the Constitutional Court, un-
der controversial circumstances, invalidated parts of it.211 In 
1994, a new Constitution gave the president even wider legisla-
tive powers.212 Decrees under Article 90, as previously men-
tioned, have the force of law, come into effect immediately upon 
publication, and are obligatory on all levels of government.213 
While presidential decrees may be overridden by parliamen-
tary legislation, the president also has veto power. As a result, 
the president’s decrees may be repealed or amended only with 
the support of a two-third majority in each house of the Federal 
Assembly of Russia.214 President Yeltsin took advantage of this 
new arrangement to introduce decrees to combat organized 
crime, partially privatize the airwaves and the state-owned tel-
evision broadcasting corporation, and introduce pension re-
forms.215 These decrees often faced parliamentary opposition, 
with members at times enacting contrary legislation for Yeltsin 
to sign.216 But the divided body could not muster enough votes 
to overcome his veto.217 Yeltsin’s choices, therefore, remained in 
effect except on rare occasions when he agreed to compromise 
with Parliament.218 
The developments in Peru in the early years of the Fujimori 
administration are also a good example of how prototypical de-
cree authority can precipitate a full-blown constitutional crisis. 
In 1990, Alberto Fujimori came to power with a landslide victo-
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ry but faced a thoroughly fragmented Congress.219 With the aid 
of delegated decree authority (that is, legislation passed by 
Congress authorizing presidential action), Fujimori enacted 
decrees in response to the economic crisis sweeping Peru dur-
ing the period.220 But it was his counterinsurgency decrees that 
faced stiff opposition in the legislative chambers; the provi-
sions, many legislators alleged, threatened civil liberties and 
democratic governance. Of the 117 decrees on economic and 
counterinsurgency issues, Congress repealed sixteen, modified 
fourteen, and delayed action on nine of them.221 It also enacted 
legislation, overriding a presidential veto that asserted con-
gressional authority over the president’s legislative powers.222 
Faced with the prospect of greater congressional scrutiny over 
his public, and some private, affairs, President Fujimori called 
out the tanks, closed, and later dissolved Congress. Peru’s 1993 
Constitution made significant changes to presidential decree 
authority, and there is evidence to suggest that the number of 
decrees and conflicts has decreased over the years.223 
India, however, stands in contrast. Severe conflicts, or consti-
tutional breakdowns, associated with presidential jurisdictions 
and decree power are unknown in the country. Given India’s 
parliamentary arrangement, both legislation and ordinances 
originate from the same source: the cabinet. Parliamentary leg-
islation originates in the cabinet, is voted upon in both Houses 
of Parliament, and is finally assented to by the president. Or-
dinances also originate in the cabinet, but are directly promul-
gated by the president. The two Houses of Parliament are not 
involved. This shared origin explains the absence of institu-
tional conflict in India. At least in the conventional view, there 
is no competing office that can challenge the cabinet’s institu-
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tional competence to midwife ordinances.224 To be sure, sub-
stantive conflicts are common with opposition parties routinely 
disagreeing about the necessity of particular ordinances. Their 
parliamentary resources, however, are limited and mostly pro-
cedural. They may table statutory resolutions disapproving or-
dinances or press for amendment motions.225 But they have no 
guns or tanks to call out. In the Indian system, opposition par-
ties can only oppose, not obstruct, the promulgation of ordi-
nances. All things being equal, cabinets will have their way. 
This is true even of minority cabinets. The salience of prototyp-
ical decree authority in India, therefore, perhaps has to do with 
Parliament’s procedural importance. Does it matter that the 
parliamentary process ordinarily involves large numbers of leg-
islators? Do parliamentary debates matter? Does open voting 
in a public forum matter? In short, does an open, public, and 
elaborate parliamentary procedure matter to the legislative 
process?226 At their best, parliamentary legislation enjoys these 
qualities, but ordinances, even at their best, do not. And that is 
the key challenge India’s “second” Parliament raises. 
CONCLUSION 
Jyoti Singh endured heinous brutality. Demanding prompt 
action against her assailants, India’s collective disgust rightly 
spilled over to the streets. But the president’s hasty ordinance 
proclaiming death penalty for rapists is emblematic of the larg-
er challenges that this “Alternative Parliament” poses. First, 
consider the timing. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordi-
nance, 2013 was promulgated on February 3.227 The two Hous-
es of Parliament assembled for the budget session on February 
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21.228 It is far from clear that the ordinance was “necessary” 
except to offer the impression of a cabinet in charge. Next, con-
sider the changes introduced. The ordinance made three signif-
icant changes to criminal law in India. It did away with the 
term “rape”; “sexual assault” took its place.229 And the latter 
was made gender neutral in some respects.230 Most critically, 
the ordinance introduced the death penalty for certain catego-
ries of sexual assault.231 Some of these changes were problem-
atic, but all were important, and a hasty promulgation offered 
little possibility of a thoughtful consideration. Finally, consider 
the retractions made. Soon after it was promulgated, news 
trickled out that the cabinet was divided.232 As the ordinance 
moved through the two Houses, several reversals were made. 
The term “rape” returned, and in its gendered form; women 
could no longer perpetrate it.233 New crimes were added, but 
with mangled definitions.234 The cabinet offered no meaningful 
rationale for the dramatic changes in February and its still 
more dramatic reversal a month later. It is almost as if the 
mechanism allows cabinets to legislate first and reflect later. 
That hardly bodes well for India’s parliamentary tradition. 
Abetted by aggressive political use and alchemic interpreta-
tions, the exceptional and temporary arrangement in Article 
123 is now normal and permanent. India’s president, acting 
through the cabinet, may effectively enact any legislation at 
any time for any reason. He or she may make it permanent by 
repeatedly repromulgating it. And even if the two Houses of 
Parliament express their collective judgment against such a 
piece of legislation, its effects endure. Indeed, if the Supreme 
Court is correct, it may permanently repeal any parliamentary 
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legislation. The conclusion then is unavoidable: India has two 
Parliaments. The president and his or her cabinet act as an in-
dependent Parliament. When analyzed in comparative context, 
it becomes clear that India’s “second” Parliament is one of the 
strongest in the world—much stronger than those in many 
presidential jurisdictions. 
If correct, this analysis raises a paradox. It began by suggest-
ing that ordinances have a large presence in India’s legislative 
landscape; there are too many of them. Since 1952, presidents 
have promulgated more than ten ordinances every year on av-
erage. That adds up to 615 ordinances between 1952 and 2009. 
But once the legal architecture surrounding ordinances be-
comes clear, and it shines through that there are no legal costs 
to promulgating ordinances and that even failed ordinances 
count as a success, that suggestion should be revised. Perhaps 
the question should be: Why so few ordinances? Not why so 
many. And that is a question worth paying attention to. 
 
